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Abstract  
Regular annual studies made by the Office of National Statistics in the UK are 
intended to show how far taxing household incomes and giving benefits in cash and 
kind to households redistributes income from rich to poor. The first attempt to do this 
in the UK was made by Tibor Barna for the year 1937. Subsequently his approach has 
been replicated and elaborated. This study reworks and compares data from various 
studies to see how the scale and nature of the state’s redistributive role has changed 
over the past seventy years. Differences in methods and data make comparisons 
difficult but some broad conclusions can be drawn. Some methodological issues are 
also discussed on the question of how to approach household equivalisation when 
services in kind are treated as income.     
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1. The motivation for the study 
The tax and social benefit policies governments choose to adopt change the 
distribution of incomes and services that households have at their disposal. The sheer 
scale of this intervention is often under estimated. I always began my lectures on the 
subject by asking students to suggest, on some rough order of magnitude, the extent to 
which the top income groups were taxed and the bottom, say twenty per cent, had 
their incomes increased by state tax and benefit policy. Rarely did my students do 
anything but seriously underestimate the scale of the state’s impact.  
 
The most recent figures suggest that before such state intervention the incomes of the 
richest fifth of households in the UK were 16 times those received by the poorest fifth. 
After taxes and benefits this ratio falls to four to one (Jones 2006).   
 
This is an accounting result, of course. The real counterfactual is difficult to set. If the 
poor had been left to starve there might have been a revolution that put the poor in 
charge or, a different political view point, voluntary agencies might have sprung to the 
rescue, more jobs might have been created and a different employment equilibrium 
have emerged, more favourable to the poor. Nevertheless, these figures provide an 
interesting and important insight into the effect of marginal changes to tax and benefit 
policy over time.  
 
Each year the National Office of Statistics (NSO), and before that the Central 
Statistical Office (CSO), produce estimates of the redistributive impact of taxes and 
benefits. They have done so since the early 1960s, using data from 1957 and 1959, 
and on one occasion back to 1953, and then annually (CSO 1962; Nicholson 1965; 
1974). The CSO and its successor subsequently published this assessment annually in 
the official journal Economic Trends. There have been critics of and adaptations to the 
methods used over time, but the series remains a regular source for academic 
commentary and political debate. (For critics see Peacock 1954; Webb and Seive 
1971; Sefton 1997; 2002. The latest survey, including an account of the current 
methods used, is to be found in Jones 2006.)   
 
The father of this whole approach was a Hungarian Ph.D. student at the LSE during 
the Second World War – Tibor Barna who was supervised by Nicholas Kaldor. His 
thesis was subsequently published as a book (Barna 1945). There had been some 
previous work in the USA on the question of the state’s redistributive role including 
the benefits it provided (Stauffacher 1941). In the UK Colin Clark (1937) had raised 
the whole question of the state’s redistributive role and how it should be represented 
in his work on the National Accounts but had not produced a detailed answer. This 
Barna set out to do.  
 
He provided a conceptual framework that is still the basis of such studies. He began 
with the distribution of income that is produced by the market for labour and the 
rewards to capital as others had done but then went on to show what impact direct 
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taxes and indirect taxes had on various income groups. These had been done as 
separate exercises before but not looked at as a whole. He then went on to add the 
impact of benefits received both in cash and kind and to integrate the whole into one 
account of the state’s redistributive role.  
 
It is a tribute to him that the conceptual framework used today in the official annual 
study of redistribution is essentially the same. However, in Barna’s time there was 
nothing comparable to the modern national survey of household incomes and 
spending on which to base his work. He was driven to rely on ingenious manipulation 
of administrative sources and contemporary poverty surveys to estimate the 
distribution of benefits and the incomes of households below the range covered by the 
income tax system. Income taxes then only affected a minority of the population.   
 
His work was later elaborated on by several authors whom we discuss later but the 
whole enterprise took a major step forward in the 1950s when Nicholson, a statistician 
at the Central Statistical Office began to use the Family Expenditure Survey, as the 
statistical basis for the analysis. It was a national sample of households’ spending and 
income that had been originally designed to provide weights for the consumer price 
index. That kind of data has remained the foundation for official studies ever since. 
However, the conceptual structure and logic is still more or less exactly that used by 
Barna.   
 
The consequence is that though there has been work estimating the impact of the state 
on income distribution for sixty years it is only the figures for the last twenty five or 
so which are published on a fully comparable basis (Jones 2006).  
 
The motivation for this paper was therefore to see whether it was possible to construct 
something like a time series for the period since 1937 – beginning with Barna’s data. 
The questions that then might be answered would be: 
? How far has the state’s redistributive impact changed over the period?  
? What tax and benefit policies contributed most to that outcome? 
 
Barna himself pointed out that such studies are fairly meaningless as one off accounts.  
‘The amount redistributed in 1937 is of real interest only when 
comparison is made with the amount redistributed at other times or in 
other countries.’ (p234) 
Just so.   
 
2.  Barna’s theoretical contribution  
Barna (1945), as we have argued, set the theoretical framework for subsequent 
empirical work. Before embarking on a detailed description of his sources and 
methods he reviewed the previous literature and discussed the theoretical issues 
involved:  
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? Who may be said to shoulder the burden of different kinds of tax? How far are 
employer’s national insurance contributions merely shifted from employers 
onto consumers, for example? He concluded that we should assume that 
employers do pass on their social insurance contributions in prices over the 
long run and such contributions are thus similar in their impact to an indirect 
tax (see page 104).That conclusion has been reached by later economists and is 
adopted in the official surveys today.  
? How should we define and measure income? What is the appropriate basis for 
measuring the receipt of income, the individual or the household? How do we 
define a household? He settled on the ‘economic family’ (p19) – the tax unit or 
household. Here we still follow. He also recognised that income was 
redistributed within the family, though he argued that ‘this is not interesting 
from an analytical point of view’ (p19)! Here modern scholars would disagree 
but we still do nothing about it.    
? How do we assign the value of benefits in kind received by a household? He 
settled on the average sums spent on services received by households of a 
given size though his ability to do this in detail was restricted. Again the 
modern approach is the same and not that much more sophisticated .  
? He drew the distinction we still use today between horizontal re-distribution of 
income through a life time and vertical re-distribution from rich to poor (p19).  
? He also addressed the problem that households were of different sizes and this 
needed to be rectified by weighting families according to the number of people 
dependent on the income generated by the household. He had limited data on 
which to do this and did not have the theoretical basis for doing so by age and 
type of dependent but he made some attempt to ‘equivalise’ which we discuss 
later.  
 
In short, most of the debates that currently surround the methods used in the official 
studies, as well as the solutions he adopted for pragmatic and theoretical reasons, laid 
the foundations for what we do today.  
 
Similar, too, were the stages in the analysis he used. He began with the ‘initial 
distribution of income’ before state intervention. We call this ‘original income’. He 
then took off direct and indirect taxes paid by households and added ‘divisable’ 
benefits that could be allocated to households both in cash and kind – services like 
health and education. He also tried various tentative estimates of the value of 
indivisible benefits – a public good like security provided by the police, for example, 
and to allocate these to different income groups. He had little confidence in these 
results and shows them separately.   
 
Overall, we can say that Barna’s approach was similar enough to those used today to 
try a comparison.  
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3.  Barna’s sources and methods 
Income: By far the most important problem that Barna faced was that there was no 
national survey of individual households’ income and expenditure of the kind we have 
today. The Inland Revenue returns for 1937 provided him with his basic data for the 
higher income groups. This was a reasonably good source for the 10 million tax units 
who came within potential income tax liability but it excluded about 12 million 
households below that limit. It did cover two thirds of all income. He used various 
social surveys of the incomes of the poor and figures of public assistance receipt to get 
some estimate of the extent of incomes below the income tax threshold, the numbers 
involved and the family composition. Above the tax threshold he used Inland Revenue 
data on dependents to undertake a crude kind of equivalisation. He assumed all 
household members, whether children or adults, counted as one, recognising this was 
too crude. He also, more oddly, assumed after some discussion, that family size was 
equal across the income bands of tax payers. (We adjust for this in our recalculation as 
we describe below.) He included small sums that were estimates of imputed income 
derived from Coop dividends and other small sources that are not statistically 
important.  
 
Taxes: The Inland Revenue returns gave him as good a picture of taxes paid at the top 
end of the distribution as we can expect from any tax returns. We discuss this problem 
further later. In making his estimates of the burden of indirect taxes he was helped by 
a recent official study of ‘The Burden of British Taxation’(Cmd. 6347, 1942) and a 
range of academic studies, for example, on families’ spending on food (p150). 
 
Benefits: Barna used administrative returns to allocate cash benefits to income groups. 
Most went to the broad lower income band he had to use. More difficult was the 
allocation of benefits in kind. Two of the categories he included in the ‘divisable’ 
group were spending on road travel and the protection of property by the police. When 
it came to deciding how to do the former he assumed that the receipts of the road tax 
were spent on roads. So he allocated back the tax on each income group as a benefit 
derived from that tax. This meant the redistributive impact would be neutral, as he 
accepted (p 200). He was merely making the point that this kind of spending is likely 
to benefit some parts of the community more than others. It is a point we could 
recognise today.  
 
Similarly he tried to allocate the benefits of the protection of property differentially - a 
legitimate Marxist argument! The sums he actually reallocated were very small 
though and do not materially affect his figures. However, the bigger issue of how to 
think about the distributive benefits of policing, let alone defence, is one these studies 
have skirted round ever since (for an early discussion see Peacock 1954).   
 
The bulk of the benefits in kind in 1937 derived from education, health, indoor relief 
and social security.  
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Barna divided the education budget by school age levels much as we do today. Nearly 
seven and a half per cent of the population did not use state schools, he was able to 
deduce, similar to today. Since a similar percentage of households had incomes over 
£400 a year he allocated no benefit of state elementary education benefit to that 
income group. This was perhaps too crude but probably not all that far out. He was 
able to make estimates of which income groups benefited from state secondary 
education, which was then provided free only on the basis of a means test. He was 
able to estimate what percentage of university students came from families with over 
£ 400 income. He calculated the rising chances of university entry according to 
household income using contemporary social studies and allocated benefits of 
university costs accordingly. Here, it seems to me, he was ahead of the official 
methodology today (Sefton 1997; 2002). He assumed benefits from health spending 
were proportionate to the size of the population group though he accepted that it 
should probably be more pro poor.  
 
Overall: Barna thus had relatively good information on incomes in slightly less than 
the top half of the income distribution, some data on poorer families from social 
surveys of the day, public assistance records and as good official data on the incidence 
of the whole range of taxes as economists of the day could provide. Benefit data was 
more rough and ready but the approaches he used to allocate it were mostly consistent 
with what we do today and in some cases better.  
 
The one big difference was his failure to fully equivalise the incomes of different 
household groups. Yet the raw data he used in his discussion on the subject, drawn in 
part from the Inland Revenue’s information on adult and child dependents and social 
surveys of the time, does provide a basis for rectifying that deficiency, at least in part, 
by applying modern equivalisation weights based on the number and types of 
dependents by income group.   
 
Another difference between his final data and today’s was Barna’s presentation of the 
overall statistics. His simple descriptive account is very close to that of the modern 
studies. He shows the percentage of income in each original income band that is 
redistributed. He also summarises this data in the form of a graph showing the 
percentage of the population receiving given shares of total income before and after 
taxes and benefits (Fig 19, p227). He does not plot this by cumulative income shares 
and does not produce a summary Gini coefficient for each stage in the redistributive 
process. This is now done by ONS and it makes it much easier to see what is 
happening. Nevertheless, it is possible to produce a lower bound estimate of the Gini 
coefficient implied by his grouped data using a programme supplied by Professor 
Frank Cowell at the LSE. (Inec, Distributional Analysis Research Programme, 
STICERD). 
 
In short, Barna’s study is close enough in conceptual terms to what is done today to 
justify an attempt to put his data into a form that is roughly comparable with today’s 
figures, albeit with the many reservations we enter later. Indeed, the founder of the 
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modern official series did exactly that in the 1970s, though only with data from the 
non retired population (Nicholson 1974).  
 
4.  Cartter’s study    
Various individuals followed up Barna’s work without fully replicating it (Weaver 
1950; Peacock 1954). The closest attempt to do so, and to compare the results with 
America, was undertaken by a Yale Ph D student using data for 1948/9 (Cartter 1955). 
One significant difference was that he failed to include locally raised taxation – the 
rates- and the expenditure it financed in the study. This amounted to less than five per 
cent of all tax revenue. This tax was probably then mildly regressive – there was no 
equivalent of the council tax benefit. Thus his overall results may have slightly 
exaggerated the redistributive effect of taxation.  
 
Cartter also had to rely on updating the material Barna had used on the distribution of 
consumer expenditure and hence the indirect tax burden. He used the Inland Revenue 
returns for those paying direct tax- by then a larger percentage of the population. The 
tax exemption limit had only risen from £125 to £135 despite the rise in incomes 
during and after the war. In this sense his income coverage was better than Barna’s 
since it extended further down the income range.  
 
The conceptual basis and the practical steps taken by Cartter were the same as Barna. 
He compares his and Barna’s findings in the text. Rather more caveats, or uncertainty, 
surround Cartter’s data as we discuss in more detail later.   
 
He did not attempt to equivalise his household data but discussed the issue and 
showed the numbers and types of dependents from the tax returns analysed by income 
group. This enables us to roughly equivalise in the same way as we did with Barna’s 
data.   
 
Cartter did employ a summary statistic to measure the scale of inequality at each 
stage. It was not the Gini coefficient but what we call the Robin Hood Index today.1 It 
is possible to recalculate this as a Gini coefficient as with Barn’s data.  
 
5  The CSO/ONS studies 
It was not until the late 1950s that another major methodological break through 
occurred. J.L. Nicholson working in the CSO recognised that the Family Expenditure 
Survey which was used to estimate consumer expenditure, and hence the weights for 
                                              
1  The Robin Hood Index uses the Lorenz curve but measures the maximum vertical 
distance between it and the line of equal income. It has the effect of measuring what 
share of total income would have to be transferred or redistributed to achieve full 
equality.  
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the consumer price index, could be harnessed to this very different purpose. It could 
produce estimates of spending by income group on different items from which the 
levels of indirect tax paid could be estimated. In addition, as a check on the 
expenditure figures, households were asked to make income returns. From this it 
would be possible to produce estimates of original incomes and direct tax. There 
would be much better data on gradations of low income. The down side was that the 
sample size was initially very small, three and a half thousand households,2 and the 
sample at the top was too small to capture the long upper tail of the distribution. This 
was the opposite to the strengths of Barna’s study that had used Inland Revenue data. 
Moreover, critics found some errors in the CSO data which led to too many low 
income units being introduced (Prest and Stark 1967). The Family Expenditure Survey 
sample was later to be substantially increased and steps taken to improve the 
representation of high incomes. The same authors also criticised the absence of any 
equivalisation and tried to correct for it.  
 
It was not until the mid 1970s that Dr McClements in the Department of Health and 
Social Security developed equivalence scales which gave different weights to 
members of a household reflecting the effect they have on family spending patterns. 
This method is still used in today’s official surveys (see Jones 2006).  
 
The impact this change made on the figures was considerable (CSO 1990). In 1987 
the reduction in the Gini on the old basis between original and final incomes was 
sixteen points. The comparable drop in the new ONS series was twenty-one points. 
More benefits go to families with dependents and that is now reflected in the new 
approach. The break in the series because of the introduction of equivalisation in 1987 
makes it impossible to use the CSO’s early studies as part of a proper time series.  
 
Nicholson himself did, however, compare the results of the CSO studies in the 1960s 
with Barna’s work. He did not equivalise either his or Barna’s households but he did 
exclude retired households from both which he thought mitigated the effect of 
changing household composition caused by the rising numbers of old people. But it 
meant he also missed out one of the big reasons why redistribution may have been 
greater in the 1960s.  
 
He concluded: 
‘ Professor Barna’s estimates for 1937, though using different sources of 
data and somewhat different methods and so not strictly comparable 
with ours, showed a surprisingly similar degree of inequality of income 
before and after redistribution, and a similar reduction in inequality from 
all taxes and benefits, to those shown in recent years.’ (Nicholson p81)   
We show his figures for interest below though readers should be aware of the 
limitations he put on them.  
                                              
2  The modern equivalent, the Expenditure and Food Survey, has 6,200 respondents.  
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Equivalisation is clearly an important step forward but it does raise a difficult 
technical problem for the approach that Barna used. The whole basis of equivalisation 
is that family spending is affected by the size and age structure of the family. An 
income of a given size is worth less to a household of four than to a single person 
household. The equivalence scales were derived from a study by McClements at the 
DHSS of family spending patterns on goods and services and the impact family size 
and composition had on household spending patterns (see Jones 2006 p96). From this 
it was possible to deduce, for example, how much impact a young child or teenager 
made on the family budget. Hence a weight could be applied to each member of the 
household reflecting the impact they made on spending. A teenage child counts as 
equivalent to about one third of the head of household and an eleven year old a 
quarter, for example. These weights can be applied in calculating the ‘size’ of each 
household for income distribution purposes. This works well for spending in the 
market place and hence in measuring the value of cash incomes for a family. But most 
families do not spend much on services like health and education which the state 
provides free. How are the ONS to equivalise household size when income is in kind 
not cash? Deriving a Gini coefficient for the final stage in income distribution was just 
not possible any longer the ONS (or its predecessor) argued. As a result they ceased 
the series produced prior to 1987 showing the overall impact of state spending and 
taxing in reducing the Gini coefficient. From then to the present day they do so only 
for cash redistribution.  
 
They explain their position thus:  
‘Strictly speaking, one could argue that the equivalence scales used here 
are only applicable to disposable income because this is the only income 
measure relating directly to spending power. Since the scales are often 
applied, in practice, to other income measures, we are content to 
equivalise original, gross and post-tax income for the purposes of 
producing Gini coefficients (and in the tables giving shares of total 
income). However, we do not think it is appropriate to equivalise the 
final income measure because this contains notional income from the 
benefits in kind (for example state education): the equivalence scales 
used in this analysis are based on household spending and so do not, 
therefore, apply to such items as notional income.’ (Jones 2006 p97)     
However, the ONS is somewhat inconsistent. In the tables which show how far each 
income group gains and loses from taxes and benefits it does include the gains from 
benefits in kind. The income ranges used to present these results are of equivalised 
income. In the final row of these tables the gains and losses for the households 
concerned are all added together including the gains from services in kind.  
 
It might seem consistent with the reasoning above the ONS should not include gains 
from benefits in kind in the same table nor should they sum the totals of incomes in 
cash and kind for the same reason as they do not in the Gini coefficient table. That 
would destroy much of the purpose of the exercise and ONS draw back from doing so 
in the main tables. However, they do apply the strict logic, as they see it, to exclude in 
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kind benefits from the calculation of an overall Gini coefficient. By doing so, they 
make comparisons over time of the full impact of redistribution impossible, and hence 
as Barna saw it, destroy much of the purpose of the exercise. This could be 
particularly important in a period in which there has been a switch towards in kind 
spending and away from cash benefits. 
 
The approach is inconsistent in a deeper way as the first sentence in the above quote 
hints. Family spending patterns depend critically on the scale of state activity. If the 
state were to provide no free schooling or cash support for schooling but require 
children to go to school, for example, then the available cash available for parents 
would be much reduced. At each stage in the process of withdrawing taxes and giving 
benefits a different spending pattern is implied by virtue of the services those taxes 
make possible. Thus applying the strict ONS logic a separate equivalence scale would 
be needed for each step in the process of tax and benefit allocation. Such a scale is 
empirically impossible to deduce as we do not live in a society with no free education 
or health care. There are no household spending figures to help us except, perhaps, 
from those who use private services now. Faced with this dilemma the ONS takes a 
pragmatic line and says – well, let us use the only data we have which analyses market 
spending in a society where the key service are free. It is not perfect but so be it. They 
take this approach for the first three stages in the process of calculating the Gini but 
not the last.  
 
Despite their reservations, the ONS did re-calculate the Gini series for me back to 
1977, including benefits in kind. It is these figures which I include below with the 
ONS reservations (see Table 1).  
 
However, another way of thinking about the problem is that it is not so much the final 
stage in the process that is the problem but the first. In the ‘original position’ as it 
were families with children would have to pay medical expenses, schooling, full child 
care costs. Instead of children aged 11 being weighted as equal to a quarter of an 
adult, school fees of, say, £5,000 or more a year would have to be paid. This would 
bring the child’s costs and equivalence score much nearer to that of an adult. An 
equivalence scale appropriate for this original position would make families with 
children appear much poorer and the original level of inequality greater than it is now. 
 
If we assume that the political market works well and we spend as a state on children 
what parents would spend if they had the same average incomes over a lifetime as 
they now do then we might adopt an equivalence scale that reflected present spending 
as society’s revealed preference spending on children. Or we could use spending data 
from families who use the private sector or a mixture of both. The Gini for original 
incomes would then be higher. The effective incomes of families with children would 
be lower.   
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Table 1: Gini coefficients (per cent) for the distribution of income at each stage of 
the tax-benefit system, 1977 – 2004/5 for all households 
Year Original  Gross Disposable Post tax Final  
1977 43 30 27 29 23 
1978 43 29 26 28 22 
1979 44 30 27 29 23 
1980 44 31 28 30 24 
1981 46 31 28 31 24 
1982 47 31 28 31 25 
1983 48 32 28 31 25 
1984 49 31 28 30 25 
1985 49 32 29 32 26 
1986 50 34 31 35 28 
1987 51 36 33 36 30 
1988 51 37 35 38 31 
1989 50 36 34 37 31 
1990  52 38 36 40 33 
1991 51 37 35 39 32 
1992 52 37 34 38 31 
1993 53 38 35 38 31 
1993/4 54 37 34 38 31 
1994/5 53 37 33 37 30 
1995/6 52 36 33 37 29 
1996/7 53 37 34 38 31 
1997/8 53 37 34 38 31 
1998/9 53 38 35 39 32 
1999/00 53 38 35 40 32 
2000/01 51 38 35 39 31 
2001/2 53 39 36 40 33 
2002/3 51 37 33 37 30 
2003/4   52 37 34 38 30 
2004/5 51 36 32 36 29 
 
Source: ONS personal communication  
Note: The ONS do not think it is appropriate to equivalise the final income measure because this 
contains notional income from benefits in kind. The equivalence scales used in the original articles are 
based on household spending and do not therefore apply to such items as notional income for 
education.  
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If one then moved to a situation in which education was free, and health too, the 
present equivalence scale could be used. The reduction in inequality would show up as 
the result of a change in the equivalence scale! Then the other stages in the process 
could go ahead - the world of cash and preferences expressed in a market place 
absolved of the need to pay for education and health.    
 
It seems that there is a case for re-examining the present approach to equivalisation 
and benefits in kind.   
 
The very notion of expenditure on health care or disability being a benefit has been 
seen as a problem. Are we right to think of such benefits as income at all? However, if 
we do need care, or to insure ourselves in case we may do, and have to pay for it, that 
is equivalent to a loss of income we could spend on other things. Here, it seems, Barna 
and present practice is right.  
 
6.  Comparing the studies over time 
The figures below are calculated and sourced in the ways described above. They are 
not a proper time series as they are based on such different sources and methods. 
However, some interesting trends emerge especially in the relative impact of different 
kinds of state redistribution. We make some tests of robustness and point out the 
difficulties in the following section.       
 
Table 2: Inequality in incomes before and after taxes and benefits. 1937 - 2005 
(Gini coefficients expressed as a percentage)  
Year Original 
market 
income 
Gross (plus 
cash benefits) 
Disposable (after 
direct taxes) 
After 
all taxes
Final income 
(including benefits 
in kind) 
1937 + 37 33 29 29 28 
1949 + 26 21 16 16 14 
1961/2* 31 25 23  24 
1969* 33 25 23  25 
1977 43 30 27 29 23 
1987 51 36 33 36 30 
1997/8 53 37 34 38 31 
2001/2 53 39 36 40 33 
2004/5 51 36 32 36 29 
 
Sources: See text  
1936= Barna 1945; 1937 = Cartter 1955; 1961/2 and 1969 =Nicholson 1974; 1977-2004/5 ONS 
Personal communication (see Table 1 including the ONS reservation).  
* Non retired only, and unequivalised 
+Lower bound estimates 
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The years shown reflect the availability of the source material. The figures for 1937 
derive from Barna’s study and 1948 from Cartter’s. 1961/2 is the beginning of 
Nicholson’s 1974 series and 1969 the end of what he claims to be comparable figures. 
1977 derives from first year of data in the ONS series derived from a personal 
communication from ONS. I have then given ten year gaps. 2001/2 is the peak, so far, 
of the post 1977 inequality in original incomes. 2004/5 is the latest data we have from 
the ONS consistent with Jones (2006).  
 
7.  Robustness and caveats 
Confidence limits 
Putting firm confidence limits on any of the early material is impossible. It does not 
derive from survey material but from estimates made on the basis of tax returns 
administrative data which are subject to errors of reporting. The tax returns which 
form the basis of the higher income categories are suspect, especially at the top end, as 
people find ways to avoid declaring their full income to the tax authorities. Again, we 
discuss this later. Some of the same problems arise with household surveys which are 
also deficient at the top end though attempts have been made to rectify this in recent 
years.  
 
The ONS figures derive from national sample surveys and here estimates of sampling 
errors can be made in the normal way. In the case of the Expenditure and Food Survey 
the standard error for average gross household income is about 1.1 per cent – ie there 
can be 95 per cent confidence that the true figure is within 2.2 per cent of the reported 
one.  
 
However, the modern studies still have to make fairly crude assumptions about how 
much financial benefit a household derives from free education or health, for example. 
Again this is discussed more below.  
 
Some cross checks on the data   
I have tried to compare these results with other sources.  
 
Original income   
 
1937 
The earliest official material for UK income distribution is the ‘Blue Book’ series 
taking its name from the annual publication setting out breakdowns of the nation’s 
income and expenditure. The series was based on Inland Revenue data – the irregular 
Survey of Personal Incomes which is the same source used by Barna for his top 
incomes. There had been several one off surveys done in the early part of the century 
but the regular official series began in 1949-50 and was discontinued in 1984/5. The 
Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (Cmnd 7595 1979) 
extended the official series back to 1938/9 and that report produced a Gini coefficient 
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for the distribution of personal income before tax for 1938/9 (see Table A.5) though 
the data refers to 1937/8.  
 
The figure differs from ours for several reasons.   
? First, it includes transfer income from government.  
? It included estimates of non taxable and other income not included in the tax 
returns. So did Barna but the methods were different.  
? There were missing returns in the 1938 data and all these missing units were 
assumed to be in the bottom income range. The number of income recipients in 
1938 was taken to be the same as in 1949 and adjusted accordingly (para 2.26). 
Barna calculated the number of units from social surveys of the time.  
? The Blue Book figures were based on the distribution between tax units which 
were not equivalised.    
 
The Royal Commission produced a Gini coefficient from this survey for personal pre 
tax income in 1938/9 of 42.3%. The figure for original income we calculated from 
Barna’s data was 37% for 1937.  
 
Nicholson (1974) calculated a Gini from Barna’s data for original income but left out 
the retired population on benefits. His Gini for that population using Barna’s data is 
33 (Nicholson 1974 p 81). That compares with ours for the whole population of 37. 
These comparisons alert us to show caution in interpreting any of these figures but, 
given the differences in approach our result does not appear outlandish.  
 
A more technical issue arises in relation to giving upper and lower bound estimates 
for the Ginis. Since ours have been calculated from grouping the data they represent 
lower bound values only.   
 
1948/9 
The base data Cartter used came from another special survey of personal incomes by 
the Inland Revenue and administrative data similar to that employed by Barna. We 
also equivalised it. The fall of 11 Gini points to greater equality between 1937 and 
1948 is striking. It mirrors in reverse the rise of ten points that we see in the Thatcher 
years. 
 
The fall in inequality in personal incomes in that period suggested by the Royal 
Commission was of six points, from a higher starting point. But because their personal 
incomes include poor relief and insurance benefits we would expect the fall to be 
greater comparing original incomes before and after the war. In 1937 there were one 
and a half million unemployed people. In 1948 there was effectively full employment. 
The unemployed in 1937 would have had virtually no original income. Poor relief and 
other benefits would have cushioned that situation somewhat.  
 
The Royal Commission also limited the fall in inequality it could measure because of 
the assumptions it made. For example, it held the percentage shares of total national 
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income gained by households in the bottom three deciles constant before and after the 
war since they had no data on them. (See Cmnd 7595 1979, Table A.5). It was 
essentially trying to see what equalising effect was caused by the changes at the top it 
did have a good handle on. Barna and Cartter make estimates of incomes in these 
poorest groups in ways we have discussed. We would expect incomes to be higher at 
the bottom in 1948 because of the tight labour market at the time as well as the 
unemployment issue. So we would expect the Cartter data to show a higher fall in 
inequality than the Royal Commission.  
 
Seers (1949; 1951) points to a considerable ‘levelling of incomes’ in the period from 
1935 to 1947. His figures suggest a higher level of pre tax inequality than ours - a 
coefficient of 42 per cent for personal income in 1938 (not 37), for example. But this 
falls to 35 per cent in 1947 a fall of seven points. Again, this is for personal incomes 
including benefits. We would expect original income inequality to have fallen more 
for the reasons given already.   
 
Lydall (1959) comes to similar conclusions about the ‘levelling’ that had taken place 
concluding that the big changes occurred in pre tax incomes rather than as a result of 
taxation.  
 
These and other early studies suggesting equalisation were, of course, challenged by 
Titmuss (1962) on two major grounds.  
? One was that rich households had found ways to move their incomes between 
family members and over time to avoid more tax and hence the Inland Revenue 
data understated the extent of inequality and may have done so more in the 
1940s just because of the rise in direct tax rates at the top end of the income 
distribution (see below). This must remain a valid criticism. However, in a time 
series study the Titmuss case depends on miss-reporting or avoiding action 
being greater in the 1940s than the 1930s since some will have undoubtedly 
happened in the 1930s too. There is no way we can put a figure on that relative 
effect.       
? The other objection was that the family composition of the tax units used by the 
Inland Revenue was changing and was not taken into account in the official 
series. In modern terms there was no equivalisation. We have done this but the 
figures are as open to his first criticism as were these earlier studies.  
More recent analysis of the Inland Revenue data for the highest income groups does 
suggest that the share of pre tax incomes enjoyed by the very highest groups did 
decline quite sharply in this period (Atkinson 2005). In 1937 the top 1% of pre tax 
incomes took 17% of all incomes. In 1949 the figure was 11.5%. The share taken by 
top 0.5% halved.  
 
Weaver (1950) shows the importance of the changes in the incomes earned by the 
working class in the 1940s. He divided the income groups into three: the working 
class with incomes of lower than £500 in 1948; the middle class with £500 - £2,000 
and the wealthy above that. He concluded that the working class had seen a real 
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increase in their per capita incomes (‘share of consumption’) of 22 per cent over 1938. 
The middle class a fall of 18 per cent and the wealthy a fall of 42 per cent. Most of the 
rise at the bottom had been the result of changes in employment and incomes while 
the top had lost because of rising tax rates. These may have been over estimates but 
the scale of the changes struck many contemporary observers as very large.    
 
 In short, our figures may show too great a trend to equalisation between 1937 and 
1948 but there are grounds to believe that the direction of change and its significance 
are correct.    
 
1950s and 1960s 
Nicholson (1974), undertaking very much the same exercise as our own, concluded 
that by the 1960s the inequality in original incomes had returned to pretty much the 
same levels as in1937 using Barna’s data (p81).  
 
Atkinson’s (2005) survey of top incomes during this period suggests that there was a 
plateau in the 1950s, and on up to 1965, in the share of incomes enjoyed by the top 
one per cent of the income range. Then there was a further decline with a pause in the 
early 1970s.  
 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) suggest a modest trend to higher inequality in after 
tax incomes including benefits between 1949 and 1964.    
 
Abel-Smith and Townsend (1965) showed that the numbers in households on incomes 
below 140 per cent of the National Assistance level had increased from nearly 8 per 
cent in 1953/4 to just over 14 per cent in 1960. 
 
The Royal Commission on Income Distribution (Cmnd 7595 1979), however, 
suggests growing equality in personal incomes before tax from 1948 to 1965.  
 
These differences are difficult to resolve but it should be remembered again that the 
Royal Commission is dealing with personal incomes that include cash benefits while 
our and Nicholson’s figures exclude benefits. The scale and coverage of cash benefits 
expanded greatly between 1948 and the 1960s.  
 
The demographic changes that took place in the period, more elderly and more 
families with children and an increase in the birth rate would have reduced equivalised 
original incomes.  
 
However, the scale of difference may well be simply an artefact of a too low figure for 
inequalities in original market incomes in 1948 which we have discussed already.  
 
1970s   
The figures for 1977 on are taken from the ONS reworking of their data on an 
equivalised basis that is consistent with their current methods. We cannot take our or 
Nicholson’s figures for original incomes as equivalent to theirs. The data sources are 
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different, as are the methods of calculating the Gini coefficient since they have 
individual household data.  
 
The figures for 1977 on are founded on a common methodology and data sources that 
are described in the latest ONS study (Jones 2006). The robustness of these surveys 
has clearly improved a great deal since the early years – the size of the sample and the 
coverage of both ends of the distribution have contributed to this. However, it remains 
the case that the treatment of benefits in kind remains fairly crude. Each individual in 
a household is allocated a given sum for the value of health care, for example, which 
is roughly speaking the average for the whole population of that age and gender. In the 
case of education the sum differs for the level of schooling – primary or secondary. 
Higher education costs are allocated to an individual student not his or her parents.  
 
The crudity of this allocation process thus fails to measure the attempts of government 
to target such spending on poor areas and on poorer households. In the past few years 
this type of government policy has grown in importance. Primary Health Care Trusts 
now have target allocations that vary considerably according to indicators of poor 
health in their populations. The least favoured demographically and socially can get 
40 per cent more resources than a more favoured area (DoH 2005; Glennerster 2007). 
The same is true of allocations for school spending. These variations are not taken into 
account in the way the ‘final income’ measures are calculated and hence 
underestimate the redistributive effect of in kind services.  
 
This approach is understandable given the methodological problems involved in trying 
to represent the impact of such local differences in national data sets. However, a 
colleague, Tom Sefton (1997; 2002) has sought to do just that. He shows that social 
services in kind, like school education, health, social care and housing, are 
significantly pro poor. The age composition of households which the ONS does 
capture is the most important factor in the pro poor nature of in kind spending but 
other policies can have an impact too, as we have seen such as attempts to target areas 
for health spending where there are more people with long standing illnesses or to 
spend more on poor housing areas. The ratio of benefits in kind received by the 
bottom and top quintile groups was 1.7. The poorer households received one and three 
quarter times as much benefit from services in kind compared to the richer fifth. That 
reduced to 1.2 times when the demographic effects are taken out.  
 
Sefton (2002) suggested that the changes in the nature and scale of the social wage 
had benefited those in the lower income groups more than the higher ones since 1997. 
Those in the poorest 40 per cent of households had benefited by 4-5% while the other 
households had gained by 1 per cent. His figures only cover the period 1997-2001 and 
the major growth in spending on health ad education has come later.  
 
The ONS figures do show benefits in kind reducing inequality by about seven points 
in 1997- a little more than in 1987. However, they show no greater equalising effect 
since 1997 and this may be an underestimate based on Sefton’s figures.         
 
  17
8.  Some compositional changes over time  
We should thus be careful about putting too much weight on any of the year by year 
figures before 1977 and comparisons with modern data but some compositional trends 
are worth noting and are likely to be more robust.  
? They suggest that the impact of tax and benefit policy since the war has been 
fairly consistent. It has reduced the extent of inequality in original incomes by 
something over 40 per cent ever since 1948 (see Table 3 and ignoring the years 
where we only have figures for the non retired population).  
 
Table 3: The reduction in inequality produced by different types of taxes and 
benefits 1937 – 2005 measured in Gini points expressed as percentages 
Overall reduction Year Reduction in 
Gini from 
cash benefits  
Reduction 
from direct 
taxes  
Impact of 
indirect 
taxes + 
Reduction 
from benefits 
in kind Absolute Percent
1937 4 4 - 1  9 24 
1948 5 5 - 2 12 46 
1961/2* (6) (2)   (7) (22) 
1969* (8) (2)   (8) (24) 
1977 13 3 +2 6 20 46 
1987 15 3 +3 6 21 41 
1997/8 16 3 +4 7 22 42 
2004/5 15 4 +4 7 22 43 
 
*Non retired households and non equivalised     
+ A minus sign represents an increase in inequality 
 
? The reduction in inequality that resulted from direct taxation was greater in 
1948 than in any other period as we might expect given the very high marginal 
tax rates of the time. However, given that the levelling effect was not as great 
as might have been expected. There are serious limits to the impact of very 
high levels of tax at the top end.  
? Indirect taxes become much more important in undoing the equalising effects 
of cash benefits in later periods.  
? Cash benefits become a much more powerful mechanism for redistribution in 
later years for reasons of social structure and employment status. The 
population ages, unemployment and long term sickness grow and single 
parenthood becomes more common.    
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? The immediate post war period was much more egalitarian than the 1930s 
though most of this can be explained by the higher levels of employment and 
wages.  
? Above all taxation and welfare benefits are reducing the scale of inequality in 
absolute terms today by something like twice the amount they were in the 
1930s and by nearly twice the absolute amount they were under the Attlee 
Government. This is despite the fact that the resulting distribution of income is 
now wider than it was then. The welfare state is having to work much harder 
merely to ensure that inequality to stands still, let alone falls, compared to the 
past. This is the result of the much higher levels of income inequality that has 
arisen in the labour market.  
 
9.  Tax and benefit policy changes 
Pre-war - 1937  
In the pre war period the scale of taxation needed to finance the welfare state was 
much lower than today. In 1937 the amount spent on social policy was about nine per 
cent of GDP compared to over twenty five per cent today. However, that spending 
was much more directly targeted on the poor than now. It was only elementary 
education that was free. Secondary education involved fees which were remitted for 
poor ‘scholarship children’. Hospitals charged fees which were again remitted for the 
poor or workers had hospital insurance. The health insurance scheme covered only the 
below average paid worker. Other social services such as the care of the elderly were 
only available free under the Poor Law. National Insurance pensions were also 
concentrated on those with lower incomes.  
 
Table 4 sets out the breakdown of spending Barna and his modern equivalents allocate 
between the households who benefit. It also shows the total of all public spending 
which includes that which could not be allocated. There is considerable similarity.   
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Table 4: Public expenditure in 1937 and 2004 
Allocated expenditure 1937 2004/5 
 £m % £m % 
Education (plus meals and student support) 124 20 59,960 22 
Public health 58 9 
Health insurance 47 7 }77,780 29 
Public assistance indoor relief 17 2 
Unemployment and poverty (excluding indoor relief) 119 19 }68,590 25 
Pensions 139 22 48,400 18 
Housing 22 3 13,380 5 
Road traffic/travel subsidies 77 12 1,940 1 
Other 36 6 -  
Total allocated expenditure 639 100 270,050 100 
     
Total public expenditure 1,103  492,410  
Allocated expenditure as a percentage of total 
general public expenditure 
58  55  
 
Source: Barna (1945) Table 58 p 217 and Jones (2006) Appendix 1 
 
Taxation 
Taxes were also very different. Total taxes amounted to only 25 per cent of total 
national income not the forty per cent they do today. Far fewer people were affected 
by income taxes. 22 million individuals were in households that did not come within 
the income tax range. After tax allowances were taken into account only about four 
million households actually paid income tax. Today those in the bottom decile are 
recorded as paying some income tax in the Economic Trends survey.  
 
Once above the tax threshold the lowest income earners paid a reduced rate of tax - 1s 
8d in the pound (8.3%). The standard rate equivalent was 25%. A ‘Surtax’ was paid 
by the higher income groups on top of income tax. It began at 5.5% for those earning 
a taxable income of over £2,000. It rose to a marginal rate of 41% at the top - £50,000 
a year or more. That amounted to a total tax take at the top of 66%.  
 
That did not mean that lower income groups paid no direct tax. They did but it was 
called a social insurance contribution. This form of revenue fell almost entirely on 
those earning less than £250 a year.  
 
The taxes on alcohol and tobacco fell very largely on the lowest income groups. 
Roughly 80% of those taxes fell on those earning less than £250 a year and half of that 
on those earning less than £125 a year. Food also carried a tax. Alcohol and tobacco, 
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despite their known harmful effects on health, are now taxed much less heavily than 
pre war. 
 
We have a much wider range of indirect taxes including some directed at changing 
other kinds of behaviour like the climate change levy and landfill tax, congestion 
charge or the airports levy but they are tiny in revenue terms.  
 
Local taxation in the form of a property tax- the rates or the equivalent to our council 
tax – constituted a much higher proportion of total revenue. The near 12 per cent of all 
taxes that went to local government included rates on business property. That 
compares to the domestic council tax which local councils can levy today which 
makes up only 4 per cent of all national revenue.  
 
Death duties were much more important compared to our inheritance tax. In 1937 they 
constituted over seven per cent of all revenue. Today the figure is only 0.6 per cent.   
The National Defence Contribution was to fund the rearmament programme and was a 
tax on profits.   
 
Table 5: Taxation 1937 to 2004/5 (Share of total revenue - %) 
 1937 1948 1964 1990 2004/5 
Income tax and surtax (personal) 24.7 31.8 32.1 27.4 26.9 
Income tax non-personal/corporate 
taxes 
6.4 6.8 4.2 10.6 9.7 
Death duties 7.3 4.4 3.2 0.6 0.6 
Stamp duties 1.5 1.4 0.8 0.8 0.2 
Social insurance contributions* 5.1 8.0 14.8 17.2 15.1 
National Defence contributions 1.5 - - - - 
Total direct taxation 46.5 51.0 55.1 56.6 52.5 
Rates (property tax/council tax 
including business rates) 
11.7 7.6 11.3 5.1 7.5 
Food 4.5 - - - - 
Alcohol and tobacco 17.1 24.5 15.4 5.2 3.1 
Private motoring/fuel duty, vehicle 
duty 
3.1 2.5 8.6 6.4 5.4 
Purchase tax/VAT - 7.2 6.5 15.2 16.12 
Other 17.1 7.2 3.1 12.0 15.4 
Total indirect taxation 53.5 49.0 44.9 43.4 47.5 
Total all taxes 100.0 100 100 100 100.0 
 
* These include both employer and employee contributions 
Source: Barna 1945; Glennerster 1992; Treasury (2006) 
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Post war from 1948  
The post-war welfare state extended health cover to the whole population and drew 
the whole population into the new National Insurance scheme. It made all state 
schooling free. The major beneficiaries were, of course, the middle class, as Brian 
Abel-Smith (1958) pointed out. The working class had been the beneficiaries of the 
old panel doctor system and the means tested hospital fees arrangements and to a 
lesser extent the scholarships to grammar schools. However, women and working 
men’s dependents did benefit from the 1945-8 changes. This issue is discussed more 
fully in Glennerster (2007).  
 
Thus, whether the new welfare state would favour the working class or make them 
worse off depended crucially on the tax structure. There was an increase in the share 
of direct taxes in total revenue but also an increase in the take of some taxes that bore 
heavily on the working class. Alcohol and tobacco taxes were even larger than pre-
war. Purchase tax on the other hand was applied to ‘luxury goods’, the more luxurious 
in government’s judgement, the higher the tax rate. Purchase tax was levied on sales 
of ‘non-essential’ items at three rates: 33.3%, 66.6% and 100%.  
 
The combined effect was to neutralise the impact of indirect tax on income 
distribution. 
 
The expanded post war National Insurance scheme was funded by what was 
effectively a poll tax – flat rate contributions paid by employees and their employers. 
We have seen that employer contributions act like a direct tax when passed on in 
prices. Thus despite the scale of ‘direct taxation’ much of it was not progressive in 
impact. Some was.   
 
The Second World War had sharply expanded the range of incomes covered by 
income tax and had raised the top marginal rates. The tax relief limits had risen very 
little despite rises in incomes. So tax bit lower down the income range. Rates of tax 
were also much higher than pre war. They were reduced compared to rates applied 
during the war but had not been lowered to the levels of 1937. The lower rates on 
incomes below £250 meant there were effectively three rates at the bottom – 15%, 
30% and the standard rate for most was 45%. That compared to 25% in 1937/8.  
 
On top was the surtax rate beginning at £2,000. That meant an additional tax of 10% 
on the range £2,000 to £2,500. This rose in stages to a top rate of 10s 6p which meant 
the top marginal rate of tax including the basic rate was 97.5%! In 1937 it had been a 
mere 86%! This meant there was an effective ceiling on declared or unhidden incomes 
set at £50,000. How much was evaded and income rearranged to avoid it is another 
matter, as Titmuss (1962) pointed out.  
 
Professor Little (1952) calculated that a single man earning £20,000 in 1938/9 would 
have taken home £10,000 but only £4,300 in 1949/50. It was little different if he was 
married and had three children. 
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Partly because original incomes were much more equal in 1948, partly because the 
numbers caught by the high tax rate were low, and partly because not all direct taxes 
were progressive, direct taxes made only a one Gini point greater contribution to 
reducing inequality in 1948 than they did in 1937.   
 
1948 also saw a one off capital levy (Special Contribution) which took away a slice of 
people’s investment income – 10% of investment income between £250-500 and 50% 
of those with the highest incomes. Death duties were levied on estates of over £2,000. 
This tax rate rose from 1.2% at that level and to 64% for the largest estates.  
 
Little (1952) concluded: 
‘The limits of the power of fiscal policy to reduce, in the short period, 
the consumption of the rich may have been reached or surpassed’. (p85)  
So it was to prove.  
 
Overall the tax benefit regime in 1948 did reduce inequality more than in 1937 but the 
big change had been in the greater equality in the pattern of rewards in the labour 
market. Work, not benefits, had made the most difference.   
 
1950s and 1960s 
Attempts were made by the Conservative administrations in the 1950s to slow the 
increase in state spending on social welfare. By the end of the 1950s this attempt was 
in full retreat. The share of the GDP spent on social policy increased from 11 per cent 
in 1951 to 15 per cent in the mid 1960s. Much of this increase went in coping with the 
rising school and ageing population but many benefits (not family allowances), began 
to be raised in line with living standards.  
 
Between 1951 and 1964 there were reductions in the high marginal rates of tax that 
had come with the Second World War. Social security contributions were increased in 
importance quite sharply – from eight per cent of all revenue in 1948 to 15 per cent in 
1964. Death duties and stamp duties began their decline.  
 
If we take a married couple with two children under 11 in 1955/6 and compare them 
to the situation in 1963/4 the combined effect of changes to tax and insurance 
contributions was to increase the contributions of those earning below £700 year and 
to reduce the tax burden tax on those above that level. For those earning £5,000 a year 
in such a family the tax reduction was equivalent to 17 per cent of their income.  
   
1970s to the present  
The big increase in inequality since about 1977 has been widely discussed and reasons 
for it analysed in some detail (Hills 1996: 2004) and will not be repeated here.   
 
Clarke and Leicester (2004) undertook a full modelling exercise on the impact of tax 
and cash benefit policy from 1979 to 2001. Their conclusions depend on what the 
counterfactual state of the world is taken to be. But, if we assume that there had been a 
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clear policy rule prior up to 1981 that benefits should rise in line with the wider 
earnings in society, their conclusions are clear.  
‘.. approximately half the total rise in income inequality is explained by 
the tax and benefit reforms.’ (p 129)  
Much of this result was caused by the failure to keep benefits rising in line with other 
incomes after 1981. The big shift to indirect taxation (the doubling of the revenue 
share contributed by VAT) and reductions in direct tax rates contributed further to the 
income widening effect of tax and benefit policy in the early 1980s. The increases in 
taxation in the Major period, 1991-7, undertaken for macro economic reasons, were 
more equalising (see Table 1.)  
 
The reduction in inequality that has occurred since 2001/2, taking all kinds of tax and 
benefits into account, amounts to four Gini points. Of that about half is the result of a 
reduction in original market income of about two points. More cash benefits targeted 
on children and the poor pensioner have reduced the inequality score since 2001/2 by 
an extra one point. The other point is the result of direct taxation- mainly the impact of 
fiscal drag bringing more people into the top tax bracket and changes to tax relief, like 
that on mortgages, which was phased out. However, more cash benefits to the poor 
elderly and children have been balanced by less to others who have no children (Hills 
and Stewart 2005).  
 
10.  Comparisons with other countries 
No other country has the long tradition of doing Barna type analyses as the UK.  
 
Conrad (1954) did try to emulate Barna for the US as Cartter had done. He concluded 
that the Gini coefficient of concentration in the US in 1950 was 45 and it was reduced 
to 41 by the receipt of benefits and to 35 for final incomes. That was less than Cartter 
had observed for the UK in 1948.  
 
The Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) does provide information on the distribution of 
income before and after taxation and cash benefits for a wide range of countries and 
does so for years that date back to the 1970s in some cases. They do not regularly 
cover benefits in kind. O’Higgins and Ruggles (1981) and Ruggles and O’Higgins 
(1981) did apply the Economic Trends methods to the US and UK. Smeeding et al 
(1993) did so for seven countries going back to the 1980s. They concluded that:  
‘Our results do not give rise to a pattern of national differences in 
poverty rates or income inequality markedly different from previous LIS 
research based on cash income alone’. (p229) 
They did not however, attempt to produce a summary measure of the overall impact 
using a Gini coefficient or similar measure. They also excluded a range of expenditure 
that was potentially highly redistributive such as the long term care of the elderly and 
younger people with disabilities. Nor did they attempt to deal with further and higher 
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education or with variations in spending across the states of the United States for 
example.  
 
The results suggest Swedish services in kind had little or no effect on the distribution 
of final income there with services in West Germany having the biggest impact. The 
Swedish effect followed from the universal nature of their services. The UK outcomes 
showed little redistributive effect except at the top end resulting from the fact that the 
rich opted out of services like education. The redistributive impact in the US was 
greater with smaller expenditure than Europe. The analysis did not go into the kind of 
detail found in Sefton’s work which suggests the impact of services in kind on 
inequality is probably much bigger than they suggest.  
 
Smeeding (2004) compared the reduction in inequality resulting from cash and near 
cash benefits and taxation again using the Luxembourg Income study. The 
proportionate reduction in the scale of inequality for the UK achieved by social policy 
is much lower than that shown in the ONS or our figures.    
 
One has to conclude that there is much more work to do here. It would need a major 
collaborative research exercise and household studies of in kind benefit receipt in each 
country.     
 
11.  Some broad conclusions   
On the figures  
It should be emphasised once again that the pre 1977 figures are not part of a proper 
series since they are derived from administrative and tax returns with a large number 
of assumptions built in at each stage in the build up of the figures. However, we have 
compared them with other sources and cautioned where problems may arise. 
  
Some general points emerge.  
? The really big changes in the final distribution of income since 1937 have been 
driven by changes in the original distribution of labour market incomes despite 
the growing scale of the welfare state. This was true of the equalising of 
incomes between the 1930s and 1948. The coming of full employment and the 
increased rewards to manual labour which was in such demand after the war 
made the big impact. So, too, perhaps, did the effect of the war on notions of 
fairness and what an acceptable gap in the reward for labour was.  
? In comparison the impact of the new post war tax and benefit policy of the 
welfare state was much less powerful. The second big shift in income 
distribution we can be sure of was in the reverse direction during the Thatcher 
era. Here, once again, a large effect was in the change in the rewards of work 
and the extent of work that was available. This time tax and benefit policy 
made inequality greater than it would have been in the absence of any social 
policy changes. Direct taxes lost some of their effectiveness in equalising 
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incomes since the 1940s and have only increased their redistributive impact 
somewhat since 1997.  
? Indirect taxes have had a growing part to play in counteracting the equalising 
effect of direct taxation since they fall most heavily on the poor.  
? Cash benefits have taken on a growing role in countering inequality as the scale 
of unemployment, old age, long term sickness and single parenthood has 
increased.  
? The scale of the welfare state’s redistributive role did grow substantially from 
1937 to 1948. Since then it has probably reduced the scale of inequality quite 
consistently by over 40 per cent.  
? In absolute terms the modern welfare state is reducing the scale of inequality 
by considerably more than it was in 1948. That this has not led to a more equal 
society than in 1948 is a consequence of the profound changes in the labour 
market and in demographic patterns which have widened the inequality of 
market incomes to such a large extent. Tax and benefit policy is having to work 
much harder merely to stand still in terms of redistribution.   
 
On the methodology 
The annual Economic Trends article should include an overall assessment of the 
equalising impact of taxes and benefits in kind as well as in cash. In the short term this 
could be achieved by publishing figures similar to those in this paper, with caveats. In 
the longer term the equivilisation methodology needs to be re-considered. 
There is a case for more comparative work on the relative impact of in kind benefits 
on inequality in different countries.  
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